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APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE
EXPLANATIONS: LEARNING FROM THE
WISCONSIN AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCES
MICHAEL M. O‘HEAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
American courts traditionally have not supplied any meaningful appellate
review of sentences.1 Indeed, prior to the 1980s, the great majority of states
did not give their appellate courts the authority to review the propriety of
particular sentences; as long as the sentence was within (often very wide)
statutory parameters and certain minimal constitutional requirements were
satisfied, the trial court‘s sentencing decision was effectively beyond
challenge, and the courts of appeals had no role to play. 2 Even in the few
states authorizing a more active role for the appellate bench, sentencing
decisions were only very rarely subject to thoughtful review. 3
Although some prominent voices began to call for reform in the 1950s and
1960s,4 proposals for more meaningful appellate review did not gain much
traction until the 1970s and 1980s, when they were often linked to a broader
effort to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing. 5 This broader effort
resulted in the implementation of binding sentencing guidelines in at least six
states and the federal system. 6
Appellate review obviously plays a critical role in a mandatory guidelines
system: it is the appellate courts, after all, that ensure compliance with the
guidelines by lower courts. What is much less clear is how appellate courts
might contribute to the sentencing process in jurisdictions that do not have
mandatory guidelines. The question has become even more pressing since the
United States Supreme Court‘s 2004 decision in Blakely v. Washington,
* Associate Dean for Research and Professor, Marquette University Law School. Editor,
Federal Sentencing Reporter. B.A., J.D. Yale University. I am grateful for comments from
participants in the Marquette Law School Criminal Appeals Conference and a Marquette Works-inProgress Workshop, and for research assistance from Brian Borkowicz.
1. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (1997).
2. Id. at 1443–44.
3. Id. at 1444.
4. Id. at 1446.
5. Id. at 1447.
6. Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED.
SENT‘G REP. 233, 239 n.3 (2005).
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wherein the Court held that defendants have a jury-trial right with respect to
fact-finding that increases their maximum punishment in a mandatory
sentencing regime. 7 Such new procedural rights will surely discourage the
adoption of mandatory sentencing guidelines in additional states. Indeed, the
Sixth Amendment principle articulated in Blakely has already caused the
federal system to shift from mandatory to nonbinding ―advisory‖ guidelines. 8
In this Article, I focus on one particular function that appellate courts
might usefully perform in the modified federal system and in other
jurisdictions lacking mandatory guidelines: that is, reviewing the adequacy of
the explanations given by trial court judges to justify their sentencing
decisions. A de minimis form of explanation review would ensure only that
some explanation was offered on the record for the sentence imposed. I have
in mind, though, a more rigorous form of review, in which appellate courts
would insist on the identification of the considerations that played the most
important role in the selection of the sentence, a discussion of how those
considerations influenced the sentencing decision, and specific responses to
any arguments made by the defendant for a more lenient sentence.
Such ―explanation review‖ is conceptually distinct from substantive
review of the sentence: the former asks whether the sentence has been
adequately justified, while the latter asks whether the sentence could be
adequately justified. To be sure, at the margins, explanation review can shade
into substantive review, for an explanation cannot truly count as an
explanation if some minimal standards of substantive rationality are not
satisfied. It will not do for a judge to explain her sentence by saying, ―I am
sending you to prison for ten years because the Moon rose in Libra last night.‖
Still, if rationality requirements are kept modest, explanation review can
retain a methodologically distinct character from the sort of substantive
review exemplified, for instance, by Eighth Amendment proportionality
review. 9 Explanation review should thus be conceptualized as a species of
procedural review10—bearing in mind that the substance/procedure distinction
may have constitutional implications in this context, as substantive review of
sentences is in tension with the Blakely principle. 11

7. 542 U.S. 296, 308, 313–14 (2004).
8. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
10. Nor is it the only conceivable form of procedural review. For instance, an appellate court
might also consider whether the defendant was given adequate notice of and opportunity to be heard
regarding the considerations that most affected the determination of his sentence.
11. Justice Scalia developed the constitutional analysis in his concurrence in Rita v. United
States:
Under such a system [in which trial courts, as a result of substantive review,
lack full discretion to sentence within the statutory range], for every given crime
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As a matter of formal doctrine, explanation review is already an accepted
feature of the sentencing law in several jurisdictions.12 But courts have
struggled to give the explanation requirement coherent content, and few
sentences are actually overturned on the basis of inadequate explanation. 13 As
I have suggested elsewhere, the difficulties may stem, in part, from the courts‘
failure to appreciate what may be achieved through rigorous explanation
review. 14
Against this backdrop, my purposes in this Article are threefold. First, in
Part II, I make the case for robust explanation review, identifying several
useful purposes that are plausibly served by a systematically enforced
explanation requirement. Second, in Parts III and IV, I describe and critique
the explanation review jurisprudence in two specific jurisdictions. Although
both jurisdictions, Wisconsin and the federal system, employ advisory
sentencing guidelines, they illustrate two different extremes in the way that
advisory guidelines may be handled in connection with explanation review. I
will argue, in fact, that both approaches are flawed. Finally, in Part V,
drawing on the best parts of the Wisconsin and federal case law, I propose a
set of principles that may be used to give explanation review more precise and
rigorous content.
II. THE CASE FOR EXPLANATION REVIEW
The functions potentially performed by explanation review fall into three
categories: procedural justice, substantive justice, and transparency and
information-sharing. Each category is examined separately below.
A. Procedural Justice
In the present context, procedural justice means treating the defendant
there is some maximum sentence that will be upheld as reasonable based only
on the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant. Every sentence
higher than that is legally authorized only by some judge-found fact, in
violation of the Sixth Amendment.
551 U.S. 338, 372 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although
the Rita majority rejected Justice Scalia‘s analysis in the context of a facial challenge, the Court did
not preclude the possibility of as-applied challenges to the system of substantive review of sentences.
Id. at 375.
12. See, e.g., Rita, 551 U.S. at 356; State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 28, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678
N.W.2d 197; Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007); State v. O‘Donnell, 564 A.2d
1202, 1205 (N.J. 1989).
13. See, e.g., an ―informational‖ provision appended to but not submitted for approval as part
of MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING § 7.ZZ cmt. k at 338 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING] (―No state sentencing system with advisory
guidelines has yet produced effective appellate-court scrutiny of trial-court penalties.‖).
14. Michael M. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 460–61 (2009)
[hereinafter O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences].
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with respect throughout the process by which the sentence is determined and
imposed, regardless of the severity of the punishment ultimately selected. 15
To some, it may seem perverse for a judge to go out of her way to provide
respectful treatment to a person who has been found guilty of a crime and who
is soon to suffer the just consequences. Yet, a considerable body of social
psychological research suggests that respectful treatment during a legal
decision-making process promotes (a) acceptance of the outcome of that
process, regardless of the outcome‘s favorability; (b) perceptions that the legal
authorities have legitimacy; and (c) a sense of obligation to obey the law in
the future.16 Thus, among other benefits, procedural justice in sentencing can
advance the rehabilitation and crime-prevention ends of criminal law. 17
Moreover, respectful treatment helps to remind everyone involved that it is
the defendant‘s conduct, not the defendant‘s person, that warrants
condemnation; the defendant always retains his essential human dignity,
which his fellow human beings are obliged to respect.18 There is, in other
words, an important ethical dimension to procedural justice. 19
The social psychology research has identified several characteristics that
can help to make a decision-making process ―just‖ in the procedural sense. 20
Two, in particular, merit discussion. First, a decision maker enhances
perceptions of procedural justice by displaying neutrality, that is, by providing
reassurance that she ―is unbiased, honest, and principled.‖ 21 Second, a
decision maker also enhances perceptions of procedural justice by exhibiting
consideration, that is, by demonstrating that attention was actually paid to the
arguments made by participants in the process, even if they were not
ultimately found persuasive. 22
Explanation review can thus advance the cause of procedural justice if it
helps to ensure that sentencing judges provide reassurances of neutrality and
consideration. To be sure, all sentencing judges likely perceive themselves to

15. See id. at 476.
16. Michael M. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 420–22
(2008) [hereinafter O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining].
17. See id. at 432–36 (discussing benefits of procedural justice to criminal justice system). The
American Law Institute articulates a similar intuition in the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE :
SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2) cmt. o at 22 (―Even if a system of laws is built on morally
sound precepts, and is well designed to further utilitarian goals, it fails if it cannot command the
respect of those it governs.‖).
18. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 476–77.
19. To the extent that victims participate in sentencing, they, too, ought to be treated in a
procedurally just fashion for essentially the same reasons. See Michael M. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining
and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 326–31 (2007).
20. Id. at 326–27.
21. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining, supra note 16, at 428.
22. Id. at 429.
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be neutral and duly considerate of litigants‘ arguments. But, especially in the
press of business in high-volume urban courtrooms, it is easy to imagine
judges not giving much self-conscious attention to reassuring others of their
neutrality and consideration. Yet, given the gulf of class, age, race, education,
and other characteristics that typically separate defendants from judges, many
defendants will surely approach sentencing with considerable skepticism that
the court system is truly neutral and will pay attention to what they have to
say. In this setting, appellate courts can play a helpful role by reminding
sentencing judges to make explicit the aspects of their reasoning that enhance
perceptions of respectful treatment.
With respect to neutrality, some of the particular concerns include
perceptions that sentences may sometimes reflect racial or other improper
forms of bias, personal vindictiveness, political grandstanding, or
unconsidered emotional reactions to the crime. Judges may diminish these
concerns by explaining their sentences by reference to general principles and
by showing how those general principles justify the particular punishment
imposed. Similarly, judges may enhance perceptions of neutrality by showing
that their sentences are based on objective benchmarks.
Likewise, perceptions of consideration may be undermined by the sense
that the judge has made up her mind before the defendant or the defendant‘s
lawyer has had an opportunity to speak, or that the judge reflexively dismisses
whatever is said by or on behalf of a defendant. Such concerns are likely
allayed to the extent that the judge specifically responds to the major points
made in the defendant‘s favor by explaining how each point influenced the
sentence imposed or providing a reason why the point was not treated as a
significant one.
In Part V, I will propose somewhat more detailed standards for
explanation review that are intended to enhance perceptions of neutrality and
consideration, but this should be sufficient for now to give a sense of how
explanation review might contribute to procedural justice.
B. Substantive Justice
In sentencing, substantive justice has two dimensions. The first measures
how well the sentence accomplishes the recognized purposes of sentencing.
The basic federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), nicely captures the
objective: ―The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to achieve the purposes‖ of just punishment (retribution),
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 23 This dimension, which I refer
23. A similar ideal is embraced in the American Bar Association‘s (ABA) STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-6.1(a), at 219 (3d ed. 1994), and in the tentative draft of the American Law
Institute‘s (ALI) MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(iii), at 1.
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to as ―purpose-advancement‖ or ―purposefulness,‖ might be sufficient by
itself, but for the fact that the purposes of sentencing are largely
indeterminate. In any given case, different purposes might point in quite
different directions.24 And, even if the purposes were more consistent with
one another or a system were devised for prioritizing purposes when they
come into conflict, 25 the science and philosophy of punishment are not
sufficiently advanced to translate a given set of offense and offender
characteristics into a precise sentencing outcome. 26 I do not mean to say that
purpose-advancement is a hopeless measure of justice; a due regard for
purposes is apt to rule out the extremes of severity or lenience in many cases.
24. For instance, while retribution theory tends to downplay the importance of criminal history
and other offender characteristics, these factors will tend to play a much more important role in
implementing incapacitative or rehabilitative purposes. This difference might matter a great deal to
proportionality review in a range of different types of cases, such as those involving a defendant with
a serious criminal history who commits a minor crime. This scenario, of course, was famously
presented to the Supreme Court in Ewing v. California, in which a multiple-repeat offender received
what was effectively a life sentence for shoplifting three golf clubs. 538 U.S. 11, 38–39 (2003)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia suggested in a concurring opinion, the sentence seems hard
to defend from the standpoint of retributive justice. Id. at 31–32 (Scalia, J., concurring). Yet, the
Court nonetheless affirmed the sentence in the face of an Eighth Amendment proportionality
challenge, with the plurality finding the sentence justifiable on grounds of incapacitation and
deterrence. Id. at 32.
25. To be sure, a jurisdiction implementing proportionality review might do as the ALI has
done and emphasize retribution as the single most important purpose of sentencing. MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 7.ZZ cmt. g at 329–31. It is far from clear, though, that
sufficient social consensus exists regarding retribution for a jurisdiction to implement and maintain
such a one-dimensional form of proportionality review. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 23, § 18-2.1 cmt. at 10 (―The Standards‘ drafters recognized that there is no
national consensus regarding the operative purposes of criminal sentencing.‖). Minnesota‘s
experience with mandatory sentencing guidelines provides an interesting case study. Although the
state‘s guidelines were designed to achieve retributive purposes, the appellate cases implementing the
guidelines system quickly recognized a variety of exceptions based on rehabilitative concerns. Reitz,
supra note 1, at 1487.
26. As stated in the draft report on pending revisions to the Model Penal Code,
Even when a decisionmaker is acquainted with the circumstances of a particular
crime, and has a rich understanding of the offender, it is seldom possible,
outside of extreme cases, for the decisionmaker to say that the deserved penalty
is precisely x. . . . Instead, most people‘s moral sensibilities, concerning most
crimes, will orient them toward a range of permissible sanctions that are ―not
undeserved.‖ Outside the parameters of the range, some punishments will
appear clearly excessive to do justice, and some will appear clearly too
lenient—but there will nearly always be a substantial gray area between the two
extremes.
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2) cmt. b at 5. Professor Paul Robinson
contends that the demands of retributive proportionality are far more precise than the ALI admits.
Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle of “Limiting Retributivism”: Does It
Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 10 (2003). As I have
argued else, however, I believe that Robinson overstates the specificity of retribution. O‘Hear, Plea
Bargaining, supra note 16, at 440–42.
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But I do mean to suggest that even the most thoughtful and well-informed
attempt to advance purposes in a particular case is less likely to produce a
single, discrete, best sentence than a range of roughly equally acceptable
outcomes.
Given this indeterminacy, a second dimension of justice also becomes
important: uniformity. This concept, too, is nicely expressed by the federal
sentencing statute: ―The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider . . . the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct.‖27 Defendants (or, for that matter, victims and the general public)
may have a hard time evaluating whether defendants‘ sentences are just in the
purpose-advancement sense, but will often more readily be able to see
whether their sentences are in line with sentences given to others who are
similarly situated.28 Indeed, resentment over sentence disparities has been
recognized as a source of disciplinary problems in prisons. 29 By contrast,
uniformity in sentencing promotes respect for the law and greater ex ante
predictability in punishment, which may enhance the deterrent effects of
criminal law and the fairness and efficiency of plea bargaining. 30
Explanation review is capable of advancing justice in both the
purposefulness and uniformity senses. This may seem a counterintuitive
claim, for I have characterized explanation review as procedural, not
substantive, in nature; yet, I am now suggesting that explanation review may
have salutary substantive effects. The connection between substance and
procedure here is established through the concept of cognitive bias.
Psychological research demonstrates that certain common human tendencies
often distort the exercise of judgment by causing decision makers to give too
much weight to some considerations and not enough to others.31
Of particular concern for present purposes are cognitive biases that cause
earlier received information to receive greater weight than later received
information, even though the ordering of the information may have little to do
with its actual relevance. For instance, there is the anchoring effect: a large

27. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006). The uniformity objective has also been embraced in the
ABA‘s STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 23, § 18-2.5(b), at 31, and in the tentative
draft of MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(b)(ii), at 1–2.
28. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining, supra note 16, at 437–40, 442.
29. Michael M. O‘Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 749, 760, 773 (2006) [hereinafter O‘Hear, Original Intent].
30. See id. at 769–70; Michael M. O‘Hear, Is Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing
Uniformity?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 309, 312–13, 319–20 (2005).
31. For an overview of some of the literature on cognitive bias, see Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78, 1518–19, 1523–24,
app. at 1548–50 (1998).
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body of research indicates that ―the articulation of a number—even an
arbitrarily selected number—at the start of a decision-making process may
play an important role in shaping the final outcome.‖32 Thus, in sentencing,
the initial articulation of a possible sentence length (say, in the form of a
recommendation by an advisory guideline, a prosecutor, or a presentence
investigation report) may cause that number to exert an important
gravitational pull on the ultimate sentencing decision, even though it may not
necessarily reflect adequate consideration of the full range of purposes of
sentencing, the case-specific facts relevant to those purposes, or the sentences
imposed on similarly situated defendants in other cases.
A similar source of bias is the phenomenon of belief perseverance: as
people process new information, they generate theories about its meaning and
significance; information received later then tends to be assimilated to the
theory or discarded.33 Consider how belief perseverance might play out in
sentencing. The first information a judge receives about a case is apt to relate
to the unjustified harm that the defendant has caused or threatened to cause;
this will be the focus of the charging instrument, as well as the presentation of
evidence at trial or (more frequently) the determination of whether there is a
factual basis for the defendant‘s guilty plea. In the face of such information,
the judge is apt to form a theory that the offense was a severe one and the
defendant is a dangerous person. 34 Mitigating information (e.g., the
defendant‘s difficult upbringing and economic circumstances, cognitive
limitations, mental illness, family responsibilities, prior good works, and postoffense rehabilitative efforts) will typically have to wait for the sentencing
process itself. Assimilated to an earlier formed theory of depravity, however,
this information is easily discounted: for instance, the presentation of

32. Michael M. O‘Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 645 (2006); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2515–19 (2004) (describing the anchoring
effect). To be sure, it is important to realize that the strength of this and other forms of cognitive bias
may vary considerably among different individuals and in different situations, and the results of
laboratory studies (typically involving undergraduate students) should not be uncritically ascribed to
highly educated decision makers operating in professional settings. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72–73 (2002). Studies of judges, however, do indicate that judicial
decisions are hardly immune from anchoring effects and other forms of bias. Chris Guthrie et al.,
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV . 1, 19–29 (2007).
33. Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 608–14 (2002).
34. Bail determinations may provide an early opportunity for a defendant or his lawyer to
present more positive information, but these are often cursory affairs, Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do
Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1726–27 (2002), and may be overseen by a magistrate or a judge other than
the one who will impose sentence.
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difficulties in life may be seen as an attempt to shift responsibility for the
offense to others; cognitive limitations and mental illness may be seen as
support for the view that the defendant is a dangerously unstable person with
poor prospects for rehabilitation; and post-offense rehabilitative efforts may
be seen as insincere and self-serving. The information might be processed
quite differently—perhaps in a more effective, purpose-advancing way—if
simply presented in a different order.
Cognitive science thus provides reasons to doubt whether judges are fully
taking into account all of the information that is available to them that is
relevant to the determination of a purposeful, uniform sentence. Indeed, there
are a number of other forms of cognitive bias that may also diminish the
quality of sentencing outcomes, such as racial bias35 and bias induced by
highly emotional victim impact testimony. 36 Of course, to note tendencies
toward cognitive bias is not to say that such biases routinely infect sentences.
And one hopes that judges self-consciously seek to avoid bias and attend fully
to all relevant information, and that defense lawyers, presentence
investigation report authors, and even prosecutors take it upon themselves to
highlight important information that might otherwise get lost in the cognitive
shuffle. But, of course, judges, defense lawyers, probation officers, and
prosecutors are often spread thin and may have little appreciation of the
cognitive pitfalls. Given these realities, process requirements enforced by the
appellate courts may make a helpful contribution.
More specifically, psychological research suggests that requiring people to
explain the basis for their decisions tends to mitigate cognitive biases and lead
to better consideration of the full range of available information. 37 This
phenomenon may result in part from the fact that explaining decisions
increases accountability,38 which can ―attenuate biases that arise from lack of
self-critical attention to one‘s decision processes and failure to use all relevant
35. See BRENDA R. MAYRACK, WIS. SENT‘G COMM ‘N, RACE & SENTENCING IN WISCONSIN :
SENTENCE AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS FIVE CRIMINAL OFFENSE AREAS 3 (2007)
(discussing research indicating that criminal justice actors perceive blacks to be ―uniquely
threatening‖ and linking ―Afrocentric facial features‖ with longer sentences, even holding offense
severity and criminal history constant); Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing:
Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 106 (2006) (―[A]n
emerging body of research on implicit bias suggests that racial stereotypes shape perceptions of the
seriousness or dangerousness of particular situations and social problems . . . .‖).
36. Bryan Myers et al., Psychology Weighs in on the Debate Surrounding Victim Impact
Statements and Capital Sentencing: Are Emotional Jurors Really Irrational?, 19 FED. SENT‘G REP.
13, 14–17 (2006).
37. Guthrie et al., supra note 32, at 36–38 (discussing how explanation requirements often
induce deliberation and reduce intuitive or impressionistic reactions that may be biased); Mitchell,
supra note 32, at 134–35 (noting how explanation requirements may reduce certain gain/loss framing
effects in choice).
38. Mitchell, supra note 32, at 135.
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cues.‖39 There are also benefits that may arise from requiring explanations to
respond to the major arguments made by the parties: studies indicate that
―directing experimental subjects to consider alternative or opposing
arguments, positions, or evidence has been found to ameliorate the adverse
effects of several biases, including the primacy or anchoring effect [and the]
biased assimilation of new evidence.‖40
Such research suggests that appellate review of sentence explanations
could help to ensure that the underlying decisions reflect more careful
consideration of all of the available information bearing on purposefulness
and uniformity. Again, Part V will suggest more specific legal principles to
achieve these substantive justice goals.
C. Transparency and Information-Sharing Benefits
A thorough sentence explanation creates a permanent record of what the
judge found to be important about the case and why. This information may be
valuable in a number of respects. For instance, in a jurisdiction with
substantive appellate review of sentences, a good record of the sentencing
judge‘s views of the case may assist the appellate court by drawing its
attention to what another judicial officer thought to be the most salient offense
and offender characteristics.41
More generally, good explanations become a conduit by which the
particular insights and experiences of trial court judges can pass to sentencing
policy makers. Trial court judges occupy a unique position in the criminal
justice system. Their perspective is more like that of a prosecutor or public
defender than that of an appellate judge—inasmuch as they see many more
criminal cases than appellate judges, and in much richer detail—but they do
not have the limitations that come with the advocate‘s role. A trial court
judge‘s position may thus provide important insights into such matters as the
relative severity of different types of offenses, the effects of incarceration on
defendants and defendants‘ families, the significance of apology, the structure
of criminal organizations, and the exercise of discretion by police and
prosecutors—all matters bearing on the selection of a just sentence. For these
reasons, the framers of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) system
39. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 265 (1999).
40. Mitchell, supra note 32, at 133.
41. Although the constitutionality of substantive review is questionable, see supra note 11, it
remains a feature of sentencing practice in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (―Assuming that the district court‘s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the
appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed . . . .‖);
IND. R. APP. P. 7(B) (―The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court‘s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of
the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.‖).
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recognized from the start the benefits of a robust feedback loop from the
judiciary to the Sentencing Commission for the purpose of improving the
Guidelines over time. 42 There seems no reason that state sentencing
commissions, where they exist, could not also benefit from such a feedback
loop.43 Legislatures might also benefit from a rich record of trial court
perspectives on sentencing. 44 So, too, would new judges whose own views of
sentencing are not yet fully developed.
Finally, prosecutors and defense lawyers could also benefit from a richer
record of judicial sentencing wisdom, if only to help them better tailor their
presentations to the particular interests of individual judges. To be sure, there
is much folk wisdom among practitioners about what different judges look for
at sentencing, but folk wisdom is not infallible—think of that childhood game
―telephone‖—and new or infrequent criminal law practitioners may not have
ready access to the folk wisdom.
D. Summary
The case for explanation review thus rests on a vision of the sentencing
process as respectful, purposeful, uniform, and transparent. Nor is this vision
an idiosyncratic one; as I have argued elsewhere, this vision animated the
national sentencing reform movement that gathered steam in the 1970s and
culminated in the adoption of the federal Guidelines in the 1980s. 45 As will
be shown in the next Part, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has also embraced
this vision in its explanation review cases. 46 Although explanation review

42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 cmt. ed. note (2006) (reprinting
introductory note to original 1987 edition of the Guidelines Manual, at § 1A4(b): ―By monitoring
when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so, the
Commission, over time, will be able to create more accurate guidelines . . . .‖).
43. Indeed, the ALI has embraced this ideal in the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE :
SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 6A.05(5), at 102.
44. Ideally, policy makers would gain access to sentencing explanations through an agency,
such as a sentencing commission, that would systematically collect and synthesize them. Even in the
absence of such an agency, however, the feedback loop could still function through media coverage
of high-profile sentencings and the publication of written sentencing opinions in case reporters.
45. O‘Hear, Original Intent, supra note 29, at 752.
46. Similar ideals lie behind the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra
note 13, § 1.02(2)(a), 1.02(2)(b)(ii), 1.02(2)(b)(viii), at 1–2 (embracing purpose-advancing sentencing,
uniformity, and transparency as general purposes of sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code).
Not surprisingly, in justifying the requirement that departures from presumptive guidelines be
explained, the tentative draft offers a similar set of reasons to those I have given for a more general
explanation requirement. First, ―[m]any flaws in reasoning, or insights otherwise hidden, come to
light only through the effort of explanation.‖ Id. § 7.XX cmt. e at 277. ―Second, the requirement
serves the goal of communication of each judge‘s reasoning process to other judges, and others in the
sentencing system.‖ Id. at 278. Third, the requirement facilitates appellate review of departure
decisions. Id. ―Finally, the requirement of a statement of reasons is intended to enhance the
legitimacy of the sentencing process in the eyes of the offender, the victim, and the public.‖ Id. at 279.
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cannot guarantee that sentencing will always live up to the reformist vision,
there are good reasons to think that rigorously enforced explanation standards
can make a significant contribution to its realization.
III. THE WISCONSIN EXPLANATION REQUIREMENT
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first clearly embraced a sentencing
explanation requirement in its 1971 decision in McCleary v. State. 47
McCleary, however, proved to have little practical effect. 48 Thirty-three years
later, the court attempted to reinvigorate the explanation requirement in State
v. Gallion.49 Again, however, there is little evidence of any significant,
sustained practical effects.50 In this Part, I will identify weaknesses in the
McCleary and Gallion opinions that have diminished the quality of
explanation review in Wisconsin. Much of the difficulty in Wisconsin stems
from the appellate courts‘ failure to insist on the use of objective benchmarks
in explaining sentences. This failure was vividly confirmed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court‘s 2007 decision in State v. Grady,51 in which the court
affirmed that Wisconsin‘s advisory sentencing guidelines need not play any
meaningful role in the determination and explanation of sentences. After
assessing McCleary and Gallion, this Part thus concludes with a discussion of
Grady.
A. McCleary
In some respects, McCleary was a visionary opinion, one that drew as
much on the national sentencing reform movement as it did on Wisconsin
precedent.
In so doing, McCleary hitched Wisconsin‘s sentencing
jurisprudence to some of the major objectives that drove the development of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system, including the ideals of respectful,
purposeful, and transparent sentencing. Yet, the ambitious purposes endorsed
by McCleary were undermined by doctrinal vagueness and hesitancy at key
points.
In McCleary, the sentencing judge imposed an indeterminate prison term
of up to nine years on a check forger with no prior criminal history. 52 He
cited the defendant‘s lack of remorse as a reason for not ordering probation,
but, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court put it, the judge ―made no attempt to
explain why the near-maximum sentence was appropriate in the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
See infra note 70.
2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.
See infra note 98.
2007 WI 81, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364.
49 Wis. 2d at 269–70, 182 N.W.2d at 516.
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circumstances.‖53 Because of the lack of explanation, the supreme court
concluded that the sentencing judge had abused his discretion. 54 The supreme
court then reduced McCleary‘s sentence to an indeterminate term of up to five
years.55 In settling upon this number, the court relied on the fact that five
years was the maximum McCleary could have gotten under three sets of
model sentencing guidelines prepared by national law reform organizations. 56
Although McCleary plainly endorsed explanation review by the
Wisconsin courts, the premise on which the case was decided—that the
sentencing judge ―gave no reason‖ for the sentence57—meant that the supreme
court did not have to provide a fine-grained analysis of what it would take for
an explanation to pass muster. But, through its lengthy reasoning and dicta,
the McCleary court sent a variety of signals, not entirely consistent with one
another, as to what it hoped to accomplish.
On the one hand, McCleary adopted an ambitious set of objectives for
appellate sentencing review—objectives that were expressly borrowed from
the national sentencing reform movement. Quoting the ABA‘s Approved
Standards on Appellate Review of Sentences, the court specifically endorsed
the following objectives:
―(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length,
having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest;
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording
him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have
regarding his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the
sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the
sentencing process; and
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for
sentencing which are both rational and just.‖58
The first and fourth of these objectives fit broadly under my heading of
―purpose-advancing‖ sentencing, the second and third relate to the purposes
of procedural justice, and the fourth embodies an aspect of the informational
53. Id. at 270, 182 N.W.2d at 516.
54. Id. at 282, 182 N.W.2d at 522.
55. Id. at 291, 182 N.W.2d at 526.
56. Id. at 289, 182 N.W.2d at 525–26. The model guidelines were those contained in the
Model Sentencing Act, prepared by the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency; the Model Penal Code, prepared by the ALI; and the Standards Relating to
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, prepared by the ABA. Id., 182 N.W.2d at 525.
57. Id. at 284, 182 N.W.2d at 523 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 274–75, 182 N.W.2d at 518 (quoting STANDARDS ON APP. REVIEW OF SENTENCES
§ 1.2, at 7 (1968)).
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benefits of explanation review. 59
Despite such high aspirations, various aspects of the opinion made it
unlikely that McCleary would actually have much sustained impact. For one
thing, McCleary seemed to demand very little by way of explanation:
[A]ll an appellate court can ask of a trial judge is that he state
the facts on which he predicates his judgment, and that he
give the reasons for his conclusion. If the facts are fairly
inferable from the record, and the reasons indicate the
consideration of legally relevant factors, the sentence should
ordinarily be affirmed. 60
There is certainly no suggestion here that an explanation need be
responsive to the parties‘ arguments, that the judge must discuss relevant
benchmarks, or that sentences must be expressly related to any of the
overarching purposes of punishment. Short of overt racism or another
obviously impermissible form of discrimination, it is not clear how any
explanation that referenced at least a few case-specific facts would actually
fail the McCleary test.
McCleary‘s force was further diluted by the opinion‘s affirmation of a
―‗strong policy against interference with the discretion of the trial court in
passing sentence.‘‖61 Also in this vein, the court indicated that the appellate
standard of review for sentences was the same deferential ―abuse of
discretion‖ standard used in some civil contexts. 62 Although the deference
was not so limitless as to save McCleary‘s own sentence, the court‘s analysis
of the facts particularly emphasized aspects of the sentencing judge‘s conduct

59. In discussing these objectives, the McCleary court drew on reasoning that particularly
emphasized the contributions an explanation requirement would make to the goals of purposefulness,
uniformity, and information-sharing:
―[T]he requirement that the sentencing judge articulate the basis for his sentence
will assist him in developing for himself a set of consistent principles on which
to base his sentences . . . .
....
. . . Since determining what sentence to impose has nearly always been a
matter of judicial discretion, few opinions have been written to explain
sentences. The knowledge and wisdom of individual judges have thus died with
them. Sentence review at least holds out the hope that the knowledge and
wisdom of our experts will not die with them. It also holds out the hope that our
system will be fairer and more equitable for that reason.‖
Id. at 280, 182 N.W.2d at 521 (quoting STANDARDS RELATING TO APP. REVIEW OF SENTENCES
§ 1.2(d) cmt. at 29 (Approved Draft 1968) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
60. McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281, 182 N.W.2d at 521.
61. Id. at 276, 182 N.W.2d at 519 (quoting State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis. 2d 147, 150, 124 N.W.2d 9,
11 (1963)).
62. McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 277, 182 N.W.2d at 519–20.
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that were unusual or easily avoided in future cases, to wit, the failure to offer
any explanation for a sentence just below the statutory maximum of ten years
and the reliance on a presentence investigation report prepared by ―a new and
inexperienced caseworker, who had, according to the record, no prior
experience or training in probation work.‖ 63
Perhaps the greatest good that McCleary could have accomplished would
have been if lower courts had regarded as a model the supreme court‘s own
explanation for McCleary‘s modified five-year sentence, which was
thoughtfully based on available benchmarks. One benchmark the court used
was the statutory range:
Since it is the role of the courts to find rationality in
legislative enactments where possible, we must conclude that
the legislature intended that maximum sentences were to be
reserved for a more aggravated breach of the statutes, and
probation or lighter sentences were to be used in cases where
the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the criminal
did not require a maximum or near-maximum sentence. The
legislature intended that individual criminals, though guilty of
the same statutory offense, were not necessarily to be treated
the same but were to be sentenced according to the needs of
the particular case as determined by the criminals‘ degree of
culpability and upon the mode of rehabilitation that appears
to be of greatest efficacy.64
Taking these considerations into account, the court concluded that a
sentence near the top-of-the-range benchmark was not warranted:
Our review of the record . . . convinces us that this is a runof-the-mine forgery case, less aggravated than many. None
of the facts set forth in the presentence report or the entire
record justifies a ten-year sentence. There is nothing in the
record to show any tendency toward violence or a tendency to
persist in criminal conduct.65
Interestingly, this conclusion that the case was ―run-of-the-mine‖ was
reached just two paragraphs after the opinion‘s author, Justice Heffernan,
referenced his own fifteen years of experience as a prosecutor, 66 thereby
implicitly suggesting a second sort of benchmark, that being the sentencing
judge‘s own prior cases.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 283, 182 N.W.2d at 522.
Id. at 275, 182 N.W.2d at 519.
Id. at 286, 182 N.W.2d at 524.
Id. at 285, 182 N.W.2d at 523.
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Another set of benchmarks, as noted above, was supplied by the model
sentencing guidelines developed by national organizations, all of which would
have established a five-year maximum for McCleary. 67 The court treated this
five-year level as the maximum sentence within the range of reasonableness,
and then actually imposed the five years in deference to the trial judge‘s
apparent desire to err on the side of a longer sentence for McCleary. 68
In all of this (save, of course, for the final step of deferring to the lower
court), the Wisconsin Supreme Court provided a thoughtful model for how a
sentencing judge might combine case-specific factors, overarching purposes
of sentencing, and objective benchmarks in arriving at an appropriately
explained sentence. But, importantly, all of this analysis took place in the
context of arriving at a modified sentence for McCleary after it was already
decided that his sentence had not been adequately explained, not in the
context of delineating mandatory features of the explanation requirement.
Given the tendency of lawyers and judges to focus on what is truly required, it
should be no surprise that McCleary had far less impact than the reformers of
the early 1970s might have hoped.
B. Gallion
Thirty-three years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly sought to
reinvigorate McCleary in Gallion. After quoting McCleary‘s admonition that
―‗requisite to a prima facie valid sentence is a statement by the trial judge
detailing his reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed,‘‖ 69 the
Gallion court observed:
Those words are as true today as they were when they
first appeared in McCleary. Yet, sentencing courts have
strayed from the directive. Instead, for some, merely uttering
the facts, invoking sentencing factors, and pronouncing a
sentence is deemed sufficient. Such an approach confuses the
exercise of discretion with decision-making.70

67. Id. at 289–90, 182 N.W.2d at 525–26.
68. Id. at 290–91, 182 N.W.2d at 526.
69. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 1, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (quoting McCleary,
49 Wis. 2d at 281, 182 N.W.2d at 521).
70. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 2. The court also quoted with approval similar criticisms from the
intermediate court of appeals:
―[T]he collective memory of the panel members assigned to this appeal could
not produce any ready examples of cases since [McCleary] in which an
appellate court overturned a sentence determination, absent the use of an
improper factor or other illegality . . . .
There appears to be some truth to the appellant‘s contention that a trial court
that articulates the magic words ‗seriousness of the offense,‘ ‗character of the
offender‘ and ‗need to protect the public‘ will avoid any meaningful review of
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After more than three decades of ―mechanical‖ compliance with
McCleary,71 why did the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempt to reinvigorate
the McCleary explanation requirement in Gallion? The answer, at least in
part, seems to lie in the recent abolition of parole in Wisconsin. In the view of
the Gallion court, the switch from indeterminate to determinate sentencing
rendered McCleary‘s mandates more urgent than ever because parole boards
no longer ―served as a check on sentencing courts‘ exercise of discretion.‖ 72
The more immediate cause of Gallion, though, was a fatal car collision
that resulted from an intoxicated driver running a red light. 73 The driver,
Gallion, pled guilty to homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and was
sentenced to prison for twenty-one years.74 On appeal to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, Gallion challenged his sentence on several grounds, including
the adequacy of the explanation provided by the sentencing judge. 75
Before addressing the specifics of Gallion‘s arguments, the supreme court
first offered a lengthy, general discussion of the McCleary explanation
requirement. Indeed, the court offered considerably more guidance, including
somewhat more exacting legal standards, than did McCleary itself. Recall
that McCleary demanded ―facts‖ and ―reasons,‖ but suggested that the reasons
would be deemed adequate as long as they did not indicate the consideration
of legally improper factors. By contrast, in its desire to end ―mechanical
sentencing,‖ the Gallion court required a more thorough explanation,
including the following components:
[Sentencing] courts are required to specify the objectives of
the sentence on the record. These objectives include, but are
not limited to, the protection of the community, punishment
of the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and
deterrence to others.
Courts are to identify the general objectives of greatest
importance. These may vary from case to case. . . .
the sentence it imposes.
Id., ¶ 27 (quoting State v. Crouthers, No. 99-1307-CR, 2000 WL 336730, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar.
30, 2000)). For an unusual example of a pre-Gallion decision by the court of appeals that overturned
a sentence on McCleary grounds, see State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 108, ¶¶ 19–21, 255 Wis. 2d 662,
648 N.W.2d 41. The same case also includes a concurring opinion that rebuked the trial court judge
in unusually direct terms for repeated failures to provide adequate explanations of sentences and
other rulings. Id., ¶¶ 22–40 (Schudson, J., concurring).
71. See Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 26 (criticizing the ―mechanical form of sentencing‖ that
resulted from the ―disconnect‖ between McCleary‘s ―principles as-stated and its principles asapplied‖).
72. Id., ¶ 33.
73. Id., ¶ 10.
74. Id., ¶¶ 11, 13.
75. Id. ¶ 14.
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Courts are to describe the facts relevant to these
objectives. Courts must explain, in light of the facts of the
case, why the particular component parts of the sentence
imposed advance the specified objectives. 76
The vision is one of purpose-advancing sentencing: ―In short, we require
that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the
sentence‘s component parts promote the sentencing objectives.‖ 77 The
Gallion court, moreover, insisted that the ―linkage‖ between facts and
purposes, on the one hand, and the sentence imposed, on the other, be stated
on the record.78 The court observed, ―Allowing implied reasoning rather than
requiring an on-the-record explanation for the particular sentence imposed lies
at the heart of [McCleary‘s] erosion.‖79
When I teach Gallion in my Sentencing class, I invoke the ―underpants
gnomes‖ from the television series South Park.80 As they explain to the childprotagonists of South Park, the underpants gnomes have a three-step plan: (1)
collect underpants, (2) [awkward silence], (3) profits. The plan is laughable,
of course, because it is missing the most important and difficult part: the
transformation of underpants into profits. The gnomes have an input
(underpants) and a desired output (profits), but no idea how to connect them.
Gallion, I think, is really criticizing Wisconsin sentencing courts for being
underpants gnomes: they recite an input (case-specific facts and generic
purposes of sentencing) and an output (the particular sentence imposed)
without explaining how the input relates to the output. Something else
besides facts and purposes must be stated before a sentence of, say, twentyone years in prison can truly be said to have been explained.
How might the requisite linkage be established? In answering this
question, the Gallion court had both a crucial insight and, perhaps, a failure of
nerve. The insight relates to the use of benchmarks: ―Because we recognize
the difficulty in providing a reasoned explanation in isolation, we encourage
[sentencing] courts to refer to information provided by others.‖ 81 Note,
though, how the court shifted from the mandatory language used elsewhere in
the opinion to language of ―encourage[ment]‖—this is what strikes me as a
failure of nerve. In elaborating on this point, the court continued to use
76. Id., ¶¶ 40–42 (citation omitted).
77. Id., ¶ 46.
78. Id.
79. Id., ¶ 50.
80. A video clip of the exchange, titled ―The Underpants Business,‖ can be viewed at
http://www.southparkstudios.com/clips/151040. The entire episode, South Park: Gnomes (Comedy
Central television broadcast Dec. 16, 1998), can be viewed at http://www.southparkstudios.com/
episodes/103595/.
81. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 47.
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discretionary language: ―Courts may . . . consider information about the
distribution of sentences in cases similar to the case before it.‖ 82 The court
also noted the availability of advisory sentencing guidelines prepared for
some offenses by the Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee. 83
The court‘s failure to more forcefully insist on the consultation of
benchmarks seriously undermined its effort to reinvigorate the McCleary
explanation requirement, for it is not clear otherwise how a persuasive linkage
may be articulated between sentencing inputs and outputs. As discussed
above, the science and philosophy of sentencing are not adequately developed
to generate some precise sentencing output given some particular set of
offense and offender characteristics. 84 In the absence of a precise and reliable
analytical process intrinsic to the recognized purposes of sentencing, it is hard
to have confidence that any given sentence was arrived at in an objective,
non-arbitrary fashion without some reference to benchmarks extrinsic to the
purposes themselves.85
The Gallion court‘s most helpful gesture in this direction was to establish
something of a rebuttable presumption in favor of probation. Gallion
indicated that sentencing courts ―should consider probation as the first
alternative. Probation should be the disposition unless: confinement is
necessary to protect the public, the offender needs correctional treatment
available only in confinement, or it would unduly depreciate the seriousness
of the offense.‖86 Probation thus became a generic benchmark for all cases.
But this benchmark is of little value in the many cases in which probation is
not on the table as a serious option, and the sentencing judge‘s real task is to
select a substantial term of incarceration within a wide range (as in the
Gallion case itself, where the judge could have selected any sentence up to
forty years of confinement 87).
Two possible explanations for the court‘s failure of nerve come to mind.
First, the court may have been concerned about the limited availability of

82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 24–26.
85. The American Law Institute makes a similar point in the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING:
An inescapable difficulty, in any sentencing policy that incorporates moral
intuitions or constraints, is that people of good faith often disagree about what
justice demands in particular cases.
Systemwide benchmarks for the
determination of proportionate sanctions provide a useful starting point for
reasoned case-specific analysis in the criminal courtrooms.
See MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2) cmt. c at 10.
86. 2004 WI 42, ¶ 44.
87. Id., ¶ 74.
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statewide benchmarks: the sentencing guidelines cover only eleven offenses, 88
while good statewide data on actual sentencing practices are hard to come by.
But a variety of solutions to the problem are available. State guidelines might
be consulted for the many offenses that are analogous to the eleven expressly
covered.89 Guidelines prepared by national organizations or agencies might
be consulted, as the McCleary court itself had done. Likewise, guidelines
from other states might also be consulted, such as the nationally well-regarded
guidelines of Wisconsin‘s neighbor to the west, Minnesota.90 The Wisconsin
statutory maximum might also be employed as a benchmark, as McCleary had
done. Additionally, as implicitly suggested by McCleary, a sentencing judge
might reference her own prior cases, 91 as well as similar cases sentenced in
the same county or reported in the published case law or in the media.
To be sure, all of these benchmarks are flawed in one way or another. But
that does not mean they are totally unhelpful, particularly when multiple
benchmarks all point roughly in the same direction. Recall, for instance, that
all three model sentencing guidelines consulted by the McCleary court
pointed to a maximum sentence of five years, which helped to convince the
court that five years was at the top of the range of reasonability for
McCleary‘s offense.
A second possible explanation for the court‘s failure of nerve lies in the
court‘s desire to avoid overly formulaic, numbers-driven sentencing. As the
Gallion court itself noted, ―Individualized sentencing . . . has long been a
cornerstone to Wisconsin‘s [sentencing] jurisprudence. [N]o two convicted
felons stand before the sentencing court on identical footing . . . and no two
cases will present identical factors.‖92 Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was undoubtedly aware that the federal sentencing system, which had long
been criticized for being too formulaic, had been specifically considered and
rejected as a model for Wisconsin in the late 1990s. 93 Yet, the Gallion court
could have more firmly embraced the use of objective benchmarks without
transforming Wisconsin sentencing into anything closely resembling the
disfavored federal system. More specifically, the court‘s mandate could have

88. Thomas J. Hammer, The Long and Arduous Journey to Truth-in-Sentencing in Wisconsin,
15 FED. SENT‘G REP. 15, 16–17 (2002).
89. The tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING also recommends such
consultation of analogous guidelines for offenses not covered by the guidelines. See MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 7.XX cmt. i at 283.
90. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 23, at xxi–xxv (noting use of the
Minnesota system as the model for the sentencing provisions of the ABA‘s Standards for Criminal
Justice).
91. Supra note 66 and accompanying text.
92. 2004 WI 42, ¶ 48 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
93. Hammer, supra note 88, at 16.
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been framed, not in terms of conformity to any particular benchmark, but in
terms of consultation of a range of benchmarks, with freedom on the part of
the sentencing judge to reject any or all proposed benchmarks so long as some
reason was given for the rejection.
Whatever the explanation for the court‘s failure of nerve, its effect became
apparent in the second half of the Gallion opinion, in which the court shifted
its attention from general principles to a specific consideration of the
defendant‘s contentions. Where McCleary offered a model of thoughtfully
explained sentencing, Gallion was guilty of the same shallow analysis for
which it rightly criticized the state‘s lower courts.
The defendant‘s central contention was that his sentence was inadequately
explained:
[H]e contends that re-sentencing is required in light of the
[sentencing] court‘s failure to describe the comparative
weight given to the factors it identified, or to explain why the
sentence constitutes the minimum amount of necessary
confinement. Gallion complains, ―almost any number of
years in prison could be plugged in [the sentence imposed].‖
He further asserts that, ―the court never stated how much
incarceration
was
needed
to
accomplish
rehabilitation/protection, or how, or why, 21 years of
incarceration was needed . . . .‖94
He complained, in short, that the sentencing judge in his case had been an
underpants gnome.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed. In reviewing the
sentencing transcript, the court cataloged the sentencing judge‘s citation of
purposes and case-specific facts. For instance, the supreme court observed,
[T]he circuit court took into account the need to protect the
public from Gallion and others like him. It determined that
the defendant could best accomplish his rehabilitation in an
institutional setting. The court also observed that society has
an interest in punishing Gallion so that his sentence might
serve as a general deterrence against drunk driving. 95
The sentencing judge made similar case-specific findings with respect to
retributive purposes. 96 But none of this is truly responsive to Gallion‘s
contention that the same purposes and facts might have been cited in support
of almost any sentence length. It is not at all obvious why the rehabilitative,
94. 2004 WI 42, ¶ 53.
95. Id., ¶ 61.
96. See id., ¶ 59 (discussing ―gravity of the offense‖).
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incapacitative, deterrent, and retributive purposes that were on the sentencing
judge‘s mind could not have been equally well, or even better, served by a
sentence of five years or forty years.
The explanation for Gallion‘s sentence would have been far more
analytically satisfying—would have been more truly an ―explanation‖—had
relevant benchmarks been invoked. Imagine, for instance, if the sentencing
judge had said, in addition to his other conclusions regarding facts and
purposes, something to the effect of:
Gallion was convicted of a Class B felony. His criminal
history, addiction, poor education and employment record,
and failure to take advantage of earlier treatment
opportunities justify his classification as a high-risk offender
under the classification system used in the Wisconsin
sentencing guidelines.
The two available sentencing
guidelines for other Class B felonies indicate a range of five
to forty years and ten to forty years, respectively, for highrisk offenders. To be sure, these guidelines relate to different
offenses, first-degree sexual assault and first-degree sexual
assault of a child. But the offenses are analogous to homicide
by intoxicated operation of a car in that all three are very
serious crimes against the person. Gallion‘s crime is arguably
more serious in that it necessarily involved a loss of life. On
the other hand, his crime was something of a strict liability
offense, which arguably requires less by way of bad
intentions than the other two crimes. On the whole, I find the
guidelines for the other Class B felonies to be helpful
benchmarks in sentencing Gallion.
Although Gallion‘s crime was a very serious one, in that
a life was lost, we must remember that everyone who
commits the same offense as Gallion is, by definition,
responsible for the loss of a life. Within the group of
homicide by intoxicated operation cases, I find nothing highly
aggravated or mitigated about the severity of Gallion‘s
offense, although the fact that Gallion was so far above the
legal blood alcohol limit makes his conduct a little bit more
aggravated than that of others. For a crime of midrange
severity committed by a high-risk offender, the existing
guidelines for Class B offenses call for a range of fifteen to
thirty or ten to twenty-five years. The sentence of twenty-one
years I have selected is just slightly above the midpoint of
those ranges. This is appropriate for a case that is slightly
aggravated relative to other cases in which the same offense
was committed by a high-risk offender.
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This proposed explanation is not beyond criticism, and it is certainly not
the only possible way to bring benchmarks to bear, but it does provide some
meaningful linkage between the facts of the case and the sentence imposed, as
the first half of the Gallion opinion indicated was necessary.97
In the end, it is hard to see how Gallion advanced much beyond
McCleary. To be sure, Gallion helped a little by stating more clearly than its
predecessor that explanations must identify which of the general purposes of
punishment are being served by a sentence, and which facts were found
relevant to determining what those specified purposes require. But the real
criticism of pre-Gallion sentencing was not a failure to recite appropriate
purposes and facts, but that purposes and facts were discussed in a mechanical
way without clear linkages established to the sentence imposed. When it
comes to addressing this problem, Gallion missed the mark by (a) failing to
insist more forcefully on the use of benchmarks, which can contribute a great
deal to making the requisite analytical linkages; and (b) affirming Gallion‘s
sentence, despite the sentencing judge‘s apparent failure to do anything more
than recite relevant purposes and facts. 98
C. Grady
If the Wisconsin Supreme Court left any doubts about its disinterest in
enforcing the consideration of benchmarks, those doubts were put to rest by
its 2007 decision in State v. Grady.99 In contrast to Gallion, Grady dealt with
an offense, armed robbery, for which a sentencing guideline was available.
Ample statutory authority existed in this context to enforce the explicit
consideration of the guideline as a benchmark. Indeed, the relevant statutory
language from section 973.017(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes (the sentencing
court ―shall consider‖ an applicable guideline) uses the exact same mandatory
language found in the federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which
(as we shall see in the next Part) has been interpreted to require express
97. Id., ¶ 46.
98. As might have been expected based on these aspects of Gallion, the decision has not had
much discernible impact at the intermediate court of appeals level. I find only two instances in
which the court of appeals has overturned a sentence under Gallion based on a trial court‘s failure to
adequately explain an initial term of confinement. See State v. Nunez, No. 2004AP3347-CR, 2006
WL 627164 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2006); State v. Perkins, No. 04-0302-CR, 2004 WL 1925891
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004). Both opinions are unpublished, which seemingly reflects a
reluctance to encourage additional Gallion claims. The impression is strengthened by the court of
appeals‘ opinion in an early post-Gallion case, State v. Stenzel, in which Gallion was treated almost
disdainfully. 2004 WI App 181, ¶ 9, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20 (―While Gallion revitalizes
sentencing jurisprudence, it does not make any momentous changes. . . . Having been reinvigorated,
we now turn to Stenzel‘s arguments.‖). To be sure, a handful of additional court of appeals decisions
overturn sentences on Gallion grounds, but these cases focus on matters other than the explanation
originally given by a trial court for a term of confinement. See infra note 147.
99. 2007 WI 81, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364.
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calculation and discussion of the guideline range. 100 Yet, the Grady court
interpreted the ―shall consider‖ mandate in such a feeble way that the
consultation of benchmarks in guidelines cases need be no more meaningful
than their consultation in non-guidelines cases.
The procedural history of Grady helps to make this point plain. After
being convicted, Grady was sentenced to a twenty-year term of
confinement.101 During the hearing, no reference was made to the applicable
sentencing guideline, and it appears that no guideline worksheet was actually
filled out for Grady. 102 When the defendant filed a postconviction motion
objecting to the judge‘s neglect of the guidelines, the judge denied the motion
with a conclusory assertion that ―the court considered the sentencing
guidelines without explicitly identifying that fact and it is clearly apparent
from the record that the court did so.‖ 103
In response to Grady‘s appeal of the ruling, the supreme court made
several decisions that served to undermine the effect of the statutory ―shall
consider‖ language. First, the court flatly rejected Grady‘s contention ―that a
judge must complete any applicable sentencing guideline worksheet.‖104 The
worksheet sets forth the factors made relevant by the guideline and, if filled
out, creates a record that the factors were, in fact, considered. Mandating that
the worksheet be filled out would be in keeping with Gallion‘s requirement of
―an on-the-record explanation‖ in lieu of ―implied reasoning.‖105 Yet, the
Grady court rejected such a mandate with little more than a conclusory
invocation of the need to preserve ―the exercise of discretion that is
fundamental to sentencing,‖106 by which the court seems to have had in mind
the freedom to ―decid[e] the weight to be given to particular factors.‖107 Here,
the court seemed to conflate substance and procedure: to require sentencing
judges to perform the procedure of filling out a guideline worksheet is not in
derogation of their authority to decide how much substantive weight to give to
the factors set forth in the worksheet. Although sentencing judges have also
traditionally enjoyed some discretion with respect to sentencing procedure, an
essential premise of both McCleary and Gallion is that this procedural

100. Two years after Grady, the Wisconsin legislature repealed the relevant language. 2009
Wis. Legis. Serv. 1021 (West).
101. 2007 WI 81, ¶ 9.
102. Id., ¶ 10.
103. Id., ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id., ¶ 38. Copies of the full set of advisory guidelines worksheets are available at
Wisconsin Sentencing Commission: Guidelines, http://wsc.wi.gov/section.asp?linkid=4&locid=10
(last visited June 21, 2010). Extensive excerpts are also available at Hammer, supra note 88, at 19–31.
105. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶¶ 49–50, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.
106. 2007 WI 81, ¶ 38.
107. Id., ¶ 31.
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discretion is not absolute, but must give way before the mandate of an
adequate explanation. And the Grady court simply did not answer the question
of why the explanation requirement requires the recitation of case-specific facts
and objectives (per Gallion) but not the filling in of a two-page worksheet.
Second, the court rejected Grady‘s contention that the ―shall consider‖
language requires that the guideline sentencing range be considered. 108 The
court suggested that sentencing judges could discharge their obligation to
consider the guideline by considering any of the five sections of the guideline
worksheet, of which the chart setting forth the range was only one. But this
seems a rather unnatural reading of what it means to ―consider‖ the guideline,
particularly when one appreciates that the range is the centerpiece of the
guideline: the whole point of three sections of the worksheet is to help the
judge determine what the range is, the fourth sets forth potential grounds for
adjustment of the range, and the fifth is merely for recording the sentence
imposed. The court also invoked separate statutory language indicating that
judges need not impose a sentence within the range. 109 However, this once
again conflates substance and procedure: the judge might consider the range
(procedure) without selecting a sentence within the range (substance).
Finally, the court rejected Grady‘s contention that the sentencing judge
was required to ―explain both how the sentencing guideline fits the objectives
of sentencing and how the sentencing guideline influences the sentence.‖ 110
The court distinguished between considering a guideline (which is statutorily
required) and explaining how the guideline influenced the sentencing calculus
(which is not). On the other hand, the court might have reasonably read into
the consideration requirement an implicit requirement that the consideration
be put on the record, which would be the functional equivalent of the
explanation Grady was seeking. Such an interpretation would mirror the
court‘s earlier maneuver in McCleary of divining from the principle that
sentencing is an act of discretion the procedural requirement that the sentence
be explained so that appellate courts can ensure that discretion was, in fact,
exercised.111 By analogy, a consideration requirement implies that the
consideration must be stated on the record so that an appellate court may
ensure that the statutory duty was satisfied. Moreover, quite apart from the
statutory duties, McCleary and Gallion provide an alternative basis for
requiring an explanation of the role played by the guidelines. As Gallion put
it, ―[c]ourts must also identify the factors that were considered in arriving at
the sentence and indicate how those factors fit the objectives and influence the
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id., ¶ 39.
Id., ¶ 41 (citing WIS. STAT. § 973.017(10m) (2003–2004)).
Id., ¶ 42.
McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519 (1971).
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decision.‖112 It appears that Grady may not have made the McCleary–Gallion
argument, 113 but the court‘s failure even to mention McCleary or Gallion in
connection with a defendant‘s claim that his sentence was not adequately
explained does not bode well for the court‘s present commitment to the two
cases or the explanation requirement they elaborated. 114
IV. THE FEDERAL EXPLANATION REQUIREMENT
A decade ago, the Wisconsin and federal systems looked dramatically
different: While Wisconsin retained a traditional indeterminate, discretionary,
guidelines-less approach to sentencing, the federal system had abandoned
parole and adopted binding guidelines, which were vigorously enforced by the
intermediate courts of appeals.115 The ensuing years, however, have
witnessed considerable, though by no means complete, convergence between
the systems. On the Wisconsin side, as noted in the previous Part, parole was
replaced with determinate sentencing, advisory guidelines were adopted for
eleven common offenses, and Gallion invited more searching appellate review
of sentences. On the federal side, meanwhile, the United States Supreme
Court‘s 2005 decision in United States v. Booker changed the federal
Guidelines from mandatory to advisory and loosened appellate scrutiny of
sentences.116 Indeed, in both systems, the role of the guidelines is now
controlled by identical statutory language: the judge ―shall consider‖ the

112. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 43, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.
113. See 2007 WI 81, ¶ 42 (―Grady does not argue that the court failed to satisfy its
§ 973.017(10m) obligation to state the reasons for its sentencing decision. His sole complaint relates
to the sentencing court‘s failure to consider the applicable sentencing guideline.‖).
114. Post-Grady decisions in the court of appeals demonstrate how marginalized the guidelines
have become. See, e.g., State v. Porter, No. 2008AP343-CR, 2009 WL 260958, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
Feb. 5, 2009) (―[W]e would affirm if the court simply stated, in any words, that its sentencing
decision did include consideration of the applicable sentencing guideline.‖). The case law was
divided, though, on the question of how to conduct harmless error analysis when the sentencing
judge did not even make the minimal statement required by Grady that the guideline was considered.
Compare id. at *2 (―[W]e cannot accept the State‘s argument that considering the same factors [as
those set forth in the applicable guideline worksheet] renders the failure to consider a guideline
harmless.‖) with State v. Davy, No. 2007AP851-CR, 2008 WL 2597574, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. July 2,
2008) (―The court‘s approach to sentencing echoed the sentencing guidelines worksheet . . . .
Therefore, the court‘s failure to refer to the guidelines at sentencing was harmless.‖). For reasons
outlined below in Part V.A.11, I do not believe that harmless error analysis is appropriate in this
context.
The harmless error issue is apparently mooted going forward in Wisconsin by the legislature‘s
recent decision to repeal § 973.017(2)(a), 2009 Wis. Legis. Serv. 1021 (West), but the issue remains
important for other jurisdictions that still require the consideration of sentencing guidelines.
115. Reitz, supra note 1, at 1466.
116. 543 U.S. 220, 245, 264–65 (2005).
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guidelines when determining the sentence. 117
Despite the increased similarity between the systems relative to a decade
ago, post-Booker federal case law has ensured that significant differences
remain. Booker itself was perhaps the high point of convergence, with Grady
and the United States Supreme Court‘s 2007 decision in Rita v. United
States118 marking a new trend toward divergence. Rita, which drained the
federal explanation requirement of much of its force, will be the main focus of
this Part.
In light of Grady and Rita, while both the Wisconsin and federal systems
are advisory guidelines systems, they present starkly contrasting ways that an
advisory system can be implemented, and both approaches are flawed in their
own distinct ways.
As to the explanation requirement specifically,
Wisconsin‘s vice is a failure to insist that explanations refer to available
objective benchmarks. This failure has likely had adverse consequences from
the standpoint of both uniformity (if sentencing judges were required
expressly to address objective benchmarks, they would be at least marginally
more likely to adhere to them, 119 which might reduce the incidence of outlier
sentences) and perceived neutrality (if judges referenced objective
benchmarks as influential on their sentencing decisions, they would reassure
defendants that the sentences were not merely capricious or based on
improper considerations).
The contrasting vice of the federal system is to place too much emphasis
on the calculation of just one objective benchmark, the Guidelines sentence,
to the detriment of both other, arguably more salient benchmarks and critical,
purpose-driven evaluation of the appropriateness of the Guidelines sentence.
The chief adverse effects here are in the areas of purpose-advancement
(required to provide little by way of explanation beyond the Guidelines
calculation, the sentencing judge may avoid much intellectual engagement
with the overarching purposes of sentencing) and consideration (the
sentencing judge can largely disregard defendants‘ arguments for belowGuidelines sentences).
Rita deserves much of the blame. Before considering what Rita had to say
regarding explanation review, though, it will be helpful to review some of the
basic contours of post-Booker federal sentencing:
 The sentencing decision is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which
requires the judge to ―consider‖ a number of factors, including the

117. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2006); Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) (2007–2008).
118. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
119. See O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 474–75.
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traditionally recognized purposes of sentencing120 and the recommended
Guidelines range.121
 Post-Booker cases indicate that ―a district court should begin all
sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines
range . . . . [T]he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial
benchmark.‖122
 ―[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence
they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by
a party. In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines range is
reasonable.‖123
 ―After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the judge] must adequately
explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to
promote the perception of fair sentencing.‖ 124
 ―If [the judge] decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted,
he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is
sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance. . . . [A] major
departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor
one.‖125
 Other than the Guidelines range, the other section 3553(a) factors need not
necessarily be given an ―explicit, articulated analysis‖ in all cases. 126
 ―[T]he appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. It must first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error . . . . Assuming that the district court‘s sentencing
decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence . . . .‖127
 ―If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may,
but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness. But if the
sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a
120. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4).
122. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
123. Id. at 49–50.
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id.
126. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the defendant‘s
argument that such analysis was required); see also United States v. Shan Wei Yu, 484 F.3d 979, 988
(8th Cir. 2007) (―It is not necessary for the district court to ‗provide a mechanical recitation of the
§ 3553(a) factors‘ so long as it is ‗clear from the record‘ that the court considered them.‖) (citation
omitted); United States v. Cruz, 461 F.3d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 2006) (―[C]onsideration [of the
§ 3553(a) factors] need not be evidenced explicitly in some mechanical form.‖) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
127. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
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presumption of unreasonableness.‖128
Before Rita, several circuits adopted an additional explanation
requirement: if imposing a Guidelines sentence, the judge was required
specifically to address nonfrivolous arguments made by the defendant for a
sentence below the Guidelines range. 129 Although Rita did not categorically
reject such a responsiveness requirement, the Court‘s analysis seemingly left
little room for it to be rigorously enforced.
Rita was convicted of perjury and related offenses, producing a Guidelines
range of thirty-three to forty-one months.130 Rita then sought a downward
variance based on three factors: (1) as a result of his career in law
enforcement, he faced a risk of retribution from other inmates while in prison;
(2) he was a decorated veteran of the Armed Forces; and (3) he suffered from
a variety of medical conditions.131 After Rita presented evidence and
argument relating to these factors, the judge nonetheless chose to impose the
Guidelines sentence. 132 He offered only a brief explanation of his decision:
The court was ―‗unable to find that the [presentence investigation report‘s
recommended] sentencing guideline range . . . is an inappropriate guideline
range for that, and under 3553 . . . the public needs to be protected.‘‖ 133 The
judge concluded, ―‗[I]t is appropriate to enter‘ a sentence at the bottom of the
Guidelines range.‖134
When his case reached the Supreme Court, Rita presented a number of
issues for review, but the only one of immediate interest was his argument
that the sentencing judge did not adequately explain why Rita‘s arguments for
a below-range sentence were rejected. And the Court did indeed recognize a
need for appellate courts to ensure that the sentencing process was a reasoned
one. 135 At the same time, the Court made clear that judges were not required
to express their reasons, but might instead rely on context and inference to
supply implicit reasoning:
[W]e cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting
upon a full opinion in every case. The appropriateness of
128. Id. (citation omitted).
129. See United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1116–18 (10th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554
(6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).
130. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007).
131. Id. at 344–45.
132. Id. at 345.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 356 (―In the present context, a statement of reasons is important. The sentencing
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties‘
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.‖).
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brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what
to say, depends upon circumstances. Sometimes a judicial
opinion responds to every argument; sometimes it does not;
sometimes a judge simply writes the word ―granted‖ or
―denied‖ on the face of a motion while relying upon context
and the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons clear.
The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge‘s own
professional judgment.
. . . [W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the
Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily
require lengthy explanation. Circumstances may well make
clear that the judge rests his decision upon the [Sentencing]
Commission‘s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is
a proper sentence . . . in the typical case, and that the judge
has found that the case before him is typical. 136
Even as to cases in which a colorable argument was advanced for a
variance, the Court hedged its language to avoid implying a duty to address
the argument expressly: ―Where the defendant or prosecutor presents
nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence, . . . the judge will
normally . . . explain why he has rejected those arguments.‖137 Here, the
Court seemed merely to describe what is usually done, avoiding the use of
such words as ―shall‖ or ―must‖ that would connote some sense of obligation.
Thus, while the judge in Rita may not have done what other judges
normally do, the lack of explanation did not violate any legal duty:
We acknowledge that the judge might have said more.
He might have added explicitly that he had heard and
considered the evidence and argument; that . . . he thought the
Commission in the Guidelines had determined a sentence that
was proper in the mine run of roughly similar perjury cases;
and that he found that Rita‘s personal circumstances here
were simply not different enough to warrant a different
sentence. But context and the record make clear that this, or
similar, reasoning underlies the judge‘s conclusion.138
Instead of accepting such implicit reasoning, a better rule would require
an express judicial response to nonfrivolous arguments for a belowGuidelines sentence. Such a rule would obviously advance procedural justice
objectives139 and achieve information-sharing benefits. The rule would also
136. Id. at 356–57 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 359.
139. I say ―obviously‖ because of the clear connection between responsiveness and the
consideration dimension of procedural justice. There may also be other, more subtle procedural
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further the goal of purpose-advancing sentencing: focusing greater attention
on arguments for below-range sentences would help judges better appreciate
when the Guidelines range is excessive relative to the purposes of § 3553(a).
This might happen when the Guidelines fail to take into account some
unusual, but important, feature of a particular case. Or it might happen when
a governing guideline has been poorly designed and fails to effectively
advance the purposes of sentencing even in routine cases. This is likely true,
for instance, of the crack cocaine Guideline, which even the Sentencing
Commission has concluded ―fails to meet the sentencing objectives set forth
by Congress in . . . the Sentencing Reform Act.‖140 Moreover, although the
crack cocaine Guideline has been a particular target of criticism for many
years, other Guidelines may be similarly flawed. 141 In any event, if judges are
required to attend more carefully to purpose-driven arguments, they are less
likely simply to impose an unjustifiable Guidelines sentence because it is the
path of least resistance. 142
Although Rita undercut the responsiveness component of the federal

justice benefits. Consider neutrality. Although adherence to the Guidelines might initially seem a
reliable way to reassure defendants of objectivity in the sentencing decision, the Guidelines‘
orientation to easily quantified sentencing factors masks a number of potentially arbitrary exercises
of discretion. For instance, if a defendant is prosecuted in federal court for committing a crime that
is more routinely prosecuted in state court, the defendant may have a colorable argument that it
would be arbitrary not to take state law into account in setting his sentence. Likewise, if a defendant
could show that most other federal defendants convicted of the same crime, either on a national or a
district-specific basis, received sentences below his Guidelines level, then the defendant might have a
colorable argument that the actual practice-based norms should be taken into account as an
alternative benchmark. To reject such colorable arguments without principled explanation is to leave
the defendant with the sense that he has been singled out for unusually harsh treatment and hence to
engender perceptions of non-neutrality. Finally, requiring responsiveness also promotes feelings of
respect in another sense: showing the defendant that a Guidelines sentence has not simply been
reflexively imposed reassures the defendant that his Sixth Amendment rights have not been violated
by a de facto mandatory Guidelines system. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 481–83.
140. U.S. SENT‘G COMM ‘N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY 91 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf.
141. See, e.g., Ian N. Friedman & Kristina W. Supler, Child Pornography Sentencing: The
Road Here and the Road Ahead, 21 FED. SENT‘G REP. 83, 83–86 (2008) (discussing flaws in child
pornography sentencing Guidelines); Michael M. O‘Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT‘G
REP. 249, 251–53 (2005) (summarizing various design flaws found throughout the guidelines)
[hereinafter O‘Hear, Myth]; Michael M. O‘Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment,
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 217–30 (2004)
(providing critique of environmental sentencing Guidelines).
142. Imposing the Guidelines sentence has become the path of least resistance because of the
interplay of Rita and Gall. Gall requires the sentencing judge first to calculate the Guidelines sentence,
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007), and then justify any deviation from the Guidelines
sentence, id. at 49–50. Rita, by contrast, permits the sentencing judge to impose the Guidelines sentence
with little or no additional justification. 551 U.S. 338, 356–57 (2007). Additionally, the appellate
presumption of reasonableness recognized in most circuits and approved by the Supreme Court, Gall, 552
U.S. at 50, ensures that the risks of reversal are very low as long as the Guidelines sentence is imposed.
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explanation requirement, it does retain some life in some circuits post-Rita. 143
On the other hand, some of the intermediate federal courts of appeals have
also imposed other limitations on the responsiveness rule that go beyond what
Rita itself seemed to contemplate, 144 such as a requirement that defendants
specifically object to explanation problems in the district court or face
deferential plain-error review on appeal.145 As I have argued elsewhere, such
limitations operate as a trap for the unwary and inappropriately limit the
usefulness of explanation review. 146
V. PROPOSED RULES FOR EXPLANATION REVIEW
In this Part, I first propose a set of rules to guide explanation review by
appellate courts in a system without mandatory sentencing guidelines. Next, I
address various criticisms that might be made of the proposal.
A. The Rules
The following proposed rules attempt to meld together the most attractive
features of explanation review in the Wisconsin and federal systems, with a
particular eye to correcting what I perceive to be the major failings of Gallion,
Grady, and Rita. I have addressed what seem to be the leading issues that
have emerged from the explanation case law, but there are no doubt other
issues that might arise that have escaped my attention.147 Thus, I offer the
143. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 470 n.72, 472 n.79; see also United
States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 2009) (vacating sentence based on inadequate
explanation). As I have observed elsewhere, Harris presents a potentially useful way of
distinguishing Rita and reinvigorating explanation review, at least in cases in which the sentence is a
very long one and the defendant was not sentenced at the bottom of the range. Michael M. O‘Hear,
Seventh Circuit Case of the Week: Sentencing Judges, You‘ve Got Some ‘Splaining to Do,
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2009/06/06/seventh-circuit-case-of-the-week-sentencingjudges-youve-got-some-splaining-to-do/ (June 6, 2009).
144. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 470–71.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United
States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007).
146. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 471.
147. I focus here on explanations given for sentences of imprisonment. As the post-Gallion
Wisconsin case law reveals, however, sentence explanation requirements can be extended beyond the
specific context presented by Gallion. See State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, ¶ 11, 312 Wis. 2d 203,
752 N.W.2d 393 (―Because the record does not reflect a process of reasoning before the trial court
imposed the $250 DNA surcharge, we reverse that portion of the judgment and order.‖); State v.
Ramel, 2007 WI App 271, ¶ 14, 306 Wis. 2d 654, 743 N.W.2d 502 (―[W]e do conclude that under
Gallion some explanation of why the court imposes a fine is required.‖); In re Richard J.D., 2006 WI
App 242, ¶¶ 11–12, 14, 297 Wis. 2d 20, 724 N.W.2d 665 (applying Gallion explanation requirement
to juvenile dispositional orders); State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217, ¶ 23, 277 Wis. 2d 400, 690
N.W.2d 452 (indicating that Gallion explanation requirement extends to reconfinement orders
following revocation of extended supervision); State v. Nelson, Nos. 2005AP713-CR, 2005AP714CR, 2006 WL 44079 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2006) (applying Gallion explanation requirement to
resentencing). Whatever the merits of these decisions, I believe that explanation review of sentences
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following list as a nonexhaustive starting point.
1. A Sentence That Has Not Been Adequately Explained Constitutes an
Abuse of Discretion and Is Subject to Reversal on That Ground
This principle was advanced by McCleary and Gallion, and is consistent
with the post-Booker federal law.148 (Of course, Wisconsin and federal law
differ when it comes to defining what constitutes an adequate explanation.)
Providing defendants with a potential remedy on appeal helps to ensure that
lower courts comply with explanation norms.
2. The Sentencing Court Must Specify the Principal Purpose or Purposes of
the Sentence
This principle is derived from Gallion.149 Consistent with the ideal of
purposeful sentencing, judges should be required to frame their sentence
explanations by reference to overarching objectives of sentencing. Focusing
attention on purposes in this way should help to ensure that sentences can
indeed be justified as purpose-advancing.150 For present purposes, I do not
mean to advocate for one particular purpose or set of purposes, but rather take
as a given that the potential purposes have been specified elsewhere (in the
federal system, for example, at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). Assuming that the
jurisdiction has endorsed more than one potential purpose, the overriding
purpose(s) may vary according to the needs of the case, as Gallion
indicated.151
This principle deviates from the federal system, where, under Rita,
sentencing judges need do little more than calculate the Guidelines sentence
in most cases.152 Thus, the intermediate federal appellate courts have rejected
arguments that sentencing judges must explain all sentences by reference to
the § 3553(a)(2) factors.153 The federal approach to explanation review,
which emphasizes guidelines over express analysis of purposes, is especially
problematic because the federal Guidelines are not grounded in the traditional
purposes of sentencing.154 A jurisdiction with more explicitly purposeadvancing guidelines might appropriately place less emphasis on case-by-case
judicial analysis of purposes.155
of imprisonment should be the highest priority. See infra Part V.B.1.
148. See supra note 142.
149. See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 40, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.
150. This principle may also advance the neutrality goal inasmuch as the purposes of
sentencing constitute facially neutral (albeit largely indeterminate) bases for the sentence.
151. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 41.
152. See O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 469.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2005).
154. O‘Hear, Original Intent, supra note 29, at 780.
155. The ALI, for instance, embraces such a model of explicitly purpose-advancing guidelines
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3. In Explaining How a Purpose Is Advanced by a Particular Sentence, the
Court Must Identify the Case-Specific Facts on Which It Relies and Indicate
How They Relate to the Purpose
This principle, too, is derived from Gallion.156 Judges should not simply
offer a rote recitation of purposes, but ought to devote real thought to how the
relevant purposes play out in the case at hand. The judge may not simply say,
―I am sentencing you to ten years in prison to protect the community from
being victimized by you again,‖ but should also add, for instance, ―Your three
prior felony convictions and the fact that you committed the present crime
while on parole indicate to me that you are likely to reoffend if released again
any time soon.‖ A detailed explanation, in this sense, helps to ensure that
sentences truly are purpose-driven and to reassure defendants that they are not
being sentenced on the basis of caprice or improper considerations. The factbased explanation can also help appellate courts to determine if there has been
clearly erroneous fact-finding and to conduct substantive review. Finally, the
analysis of how to implement purposes of punishment can educate policy
makers and others regarding trial-court perspectives on criminal justice.
4. For Prison Sentences, the Explanation Should Make Clear Both Why a
Sentence of Probation Was Rejected and Why a Materially Shorter Term of
Confinement Would Not Have Adequately Accomplished the Relevant
Purposes of Sentencing
Gallion clearly endorsed the first part of this principle, that is, explaining
why probation was rejected,157 but was less clear about the latter. On the one
hand, the court stated, ―[I]f a [sentencing] court imposes jail or prison, it shall
explain why the duration of incarceration should be expected to advance the
objectives it has specified.‖158
On the other hand, the court also
acknowledged,
We are mindful that the exercise of discretion does not
lend itself to mathematical precision. The exercise of
discretion, by its very nature, is not amenable to such a task.
As a result, we do not expect [sentencing] courts to explain,
for instance, the difference between sentences of 15 and 17
years.159
Moreover, the fact that the court did not respond effectively to Gallion‘s
own argument that ―almost any number of years of prison could be plugged
in the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 6B.03 cmt. a at 179.
156. 2004 WI 42, ¶ 42.
157. Id., ¶¶ 21, 25, 44.
158. Id., ¶ 45 (emphasis added).
159. Id., ¶ 49.
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in‖160 also tends to undermine the extent to which Gallion can be read to
require explanation for material, incremental increases in sentence length.
Yet, it should go without saying that, for defendants, there is a profound
difference between, for instance, five years and twenty-five years in prison.
Such differences should be explained no less than the decision to sentence the
defendant to prison in the first place.
The real difficulty with this principle is how to identify the line of
materiality. I would agree with the Gallion court, for instance, that the
difference between fifteen and seventeen years is not so great as to warrant
specific explanation. As a somewhat arbitrary, but reasonably workable,
dividing line, I would suggest a rule of thirds: the judge should be required to
explain why a sentence one-third less than the sentence imposed was not
adequate in light of the relevant purposes of sentencing. Thus, for instance,
the judge in Gallion would not have been required to explain why a sentence
of twenty-one years was imposed instead of eighteen, but would have been
required to justify twenty-one over fourteen.
5. If There Is an Applicable Advisory Sentencing Guideline, the Court Must
Determine What Range Is Recommended by the Guideline, Unless the Court
Expressly Finds that the Benefits of Calculating the Guideline Range Do Not
Warrant the Costs
On the whole, this principle is meant to endorse the federal over the
Wisconsin approach to advisory guidelines. 161 I have already noted the
neutrality and uniformity benefits of using objective benchmarks in
sentencing,162 and a guideline range, where one is available, seems an
obviously important benchmark to consult. On the other hand, calculating a
range may sometimes require a judge to resolve complex legal or factual
disputes. If the judge has some other benchmark in mind that is clearly more
salient (for instance, if the circumstances of the case are so aggravated that the
judge is committed to imposing a sentence at or near the top of the statutory
range regardless of what the guideline recommends), then the judge might
appropriately decide not to bother with the complex guideline questions.
Likewise, if a guideline question appears to be a close one, but will not have a
large effect on the ultimate guideline recommendation, the judge might
simply split the difference without unduly undermining the goal of principled
sentencing based on objective benchmarks. 163
160. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
161. For advisory guidelines systems, the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
also requires that sentencing judges ―consult the sentencing guidelines carefully and accurately.‖ See
MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 7.XX cmt. i at 284.
162. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
163. Even the federal courts have recognized that it may not be necessary to resolve all
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6. If the Sentence Is Outside an Applicable Advisory Guideline Range, the
Court Must Explain Why the Sentence Chosen Is Believed to Advance the
Relevant Purposes of Sentencing Better than the Guideline Sentence
Like the previous principle, this one more closely follows the federal
approach than Wisconsin‘s, although it is not intended to embrace all of the
limitations on non-Guidelines sentences that have appeared in the post-Booker
jurisprudence. 164 As long as the sentencing judge offers a reason that is
rationally related to one or more of the purposes of sentencing, that reason
should suffice. The reason might rest on something unusual in the case not
taken into account in the guideline, on a principled policy disagreement with
the drafters of the guideline, or on a justifiable conclusion that some other
objective benchmark must also be taken into account. To demand much more
than this would be to move nominally advisory guidelines far down the path
toward mandatory, which (among other potential difficulties) might raise
significant Sixth Amendment issues. But to fail to demand any explanation
for a non-guideline sentence (as Wisconsin does) seems to sacrifice the
neutrality and uniformity values embodied in a guideline system without
much countervailing benefit. It also undermines the feedback loop that might
lead to better guidelines.165
7. If the Sentence Is Within the Applicable Advisory Guideline Range, the
Court Must Expressly Address Any Nonfrivolous Arguments Made by the
Defendant for a Sentence Below the Range and Explain Why the Arguments
Were Rejected
This principle represents a rejection of Rita, and instead adopts the
approach suggested by the Seventh Circuit in the pre-Rita case United States
v. Cunningham.166 The principle is intended to address the concerns that Rita
may lead in some cases to the mechanical imposition of an unjustifiably harsh
Guidelines issues now that the Guidelines are advisory. See, e.g., United States v. Sanner, 565 F.3d
400, 405–06 (7th Cir. 2009).
164. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (―[A] major departure should be
supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.‖). Additionally, it remains unclear how
much authority federal district court judges have to impose a sentence outside the applicable range
because of a policy disagreement with the Guidelines. Although the Supreme Court authorized such
variances in the crack cocaine context in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–02, 111
(2007), some lower courts have suggested that the authority is essentially limited to crack cases, see,
e.g., United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (―Kimbrough dealt only
with certain Guidelines—those that, like the crack cocaine Guidelines, ‗do not exemplify the
Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic institutional role.‘‖) (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109).
165. For similar reasons, the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING also requires
an explanation for departures even from advisory guidelines—indeed, the tentative draft goes further
by requiring that the explanations be in writing. See MODEL PENAL CODE : SENTENCING, supra note
13, § 7.XX cmt. i at 284–86.
166. 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).
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guideline sentence, or at least to perceptions of such a reflexive approach.
8. The Court Must Specifically Identify What Benchmark or Benchmarks
Were Used in Setting the Sentence and Why They Were Believed to Be
Relevant
I assume here that the overarching purposes of sentencing are sufficiently
indeterminate that a specific sentence cannot rationally be selected without
reference, conscious or unconscious, to a benchmark of some sort, even if it is
only the judge‘s recollection of sentences that she has previously imposed in
similar cases. Consistent with the goal of reassuring defendants that
sentencing occurs in a neutral fashion, the benchmarks used should be
expressly identified.
Appropriate benchmarks might include the
recommended range from an applicable or analogous sentencing guideline
(potentially including guidelines from other jurisdictions or national
organizations, as were consulted in McCleary167), the statutory sentencing
range (in the sense that unusually mitigated cases should be sentenced near
the bottom of the range, unusually aggravated cases near the top, and typical
cases somewhere in between), data on actual sentencing practices (which
might be considered at a local, state, or national level 168), sentences imposed
on codefendants, and sentences imposed on the same defendant in earlier
cases.
Other benchmarks of potential value include the recommendations of
probation officers and lawyers.
Practice varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction as to whether presentence investigation reports are routinely
prepared by probation officers, and, when they are prepared, whether they
include sentencing recommendations. Where available, a recommendation by
a thoughtful, experienced probation officer may constitute a neutral

167. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 289–90, 182 N.W.2d 512, 525–26 (1971).
168. In many jurisdictions, it is difficult to find reliable state and local data, which might lead
by default to consultation of national data collected by the federal government. Data on sentences in
federal court are available in easily searchable form at the web site of the Bureau of Justice Statistics‘
Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, http://fjsrc.urban.org/ (last visited June 22, 2010). Federal
data on sentencing in state courts is less detailed, but still potentially useful as a benchmark. The
data are summarized in regular reports issued by the United States Department of Justice‘s Bureau of
Justice Statistics, which can be downloaded from Crime & Justice Electronic Data Spreadsheets:
Corrections, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dtdata.cfm#corrections (last visited June 22, 2010).
For reasons that I have suggested elsewhere, it is preferable to rely on local sentencing law and
practice—even in federal court—for crimes that are essentially local in character, which would
include most routine street crime. Michael M. O‘Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity:
Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal–State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 721, 753–63 (2002). By focusing attention on the use of benchmarks in sentencing, explanation
review in the appellate courts might spur the collection of good, local sentencing data by the courts,
prosecutors‘ offices, or public defender agencies. In the absence of such data, national data may still
be of some benchmarking value.
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benchmark that is capable of advancing purposefulness and uniformity
values. 169
Likewise, practice varies with respect to recommendations by prosecutors
and defense lawyers. Their recommendations, of course, do not carry the
presumptive neutrality of a probation officer‘s. Procedural justice concerns
should thus make judges wary about giving much weight to prosecutor
recommendations, particularly when they deviate substantially from those of
defense counsel. Even when the prosecutor and defense counsel agree, judges
might appropriately decide not to go along with the deal, for the deal may
reflect what is convenient for the lawyers more than what best advances the
interests of purposeful, uniform sentencing. On the other hand, experienced,
thoughtful lawyers may have much to contribute to the fashioning of a
substantively just sentence. For that reason, lawyer recommendations should
not be rejected out of hand as an appropriate benchmark.
9. If the Defendant Offers a Benchmark that the Court Rejects, the Court
Must Explain Why the Benchmark Was Determined Not to Be Appropriate
This principle parallels the earlier requirement that arguments for a belowguidelines sentence should be expressly addressed.
10. If the Defendant Makes Any Nonfrivolous Arguments for Lenience, the
Court Must Identify Which Arguments Were Found to Have Merit, What
Role Those Arguments Played in the Selection of the Sentence, and Why the
Remaining Arguments (If Any) Were Found Not to Have Merit
This principle, like the previous one, requires responsiveness to
defendants‘ arguments. It is added as something of a catchall, recognizing
that some arguments for lenience may not be framed as requests for a belowguidelines sentence or as proposals for a particular benchmark.
11. Explanation Challenges Should Not Be Subject to Harmless Error
Analysis on Appeal
If the only purpose of explanation review were to ensure substantively
good sentences, then it might make sense to employ harmless error analysis,
that is, to affirm poorly explained sentences if the factors neglected in the

169. For an example of a case that reversed a sentence in part for the failure of the sentencing
judge to explain why he imposed a sentence that far exceeded the recommendation of the probation
officer, see State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 108, ¶¶ 15–17, 255 Wis. 2d 662, 648 N.W.2d 41. Without
discussing Hall, the Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently limited its reach in State v. Taylor, 2006
WI 22, ¶¶ 29–30, 289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466, in which the court affirmed the sentence despite
the fact that the trial court ―did not explicitly state why, in its discretion, it added six more years of
initial confinement onto the [presentence investigation report] recommendation.‖ On the other hand,
Taylor was limited on its own terms to pre-Gallion law, id., ¶ 17 n.9, leaving open the possibility that
a similar case would be decided differently today.
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explanation were unlikely to influence the outcome. (I say ―might,‖ because,
even just with a view to the substantive quality of the sentence, harmless error
analysis may give too much room for the cognitive biases discussed above to
operate at the appellate level, too170—that is, the sentence imposed below may
unduly condition the appellate court‘s evaluation of what constitutes a just
sentence.) But the purposes of explanation review also encompass procedural
justice and information sharing. In light of those purposes, something is lost
with a poorly explained sentence even if there is no good reason to think the
outcome would have been altered by the unaddressed considerations. To send
a clear message to sentencing judges about the importance of good
explanations, poorly explained sentences should be vacated and remanded for
resentencing without regard to harmless error.171
B. Addressing Potential Objections
1. Excessive Transaction Costs
Robust explanation requirements make the courts do more work. As with
any incremental process requirement, it is fair to ask whether the benefits
warrant the additional transaction costs. Unfortunately, such questions do not
lend themselves to straightforward answers, because the benefits of
incremental process (procedural justice effects, substantively higher-quality
decisions, and enhanced transparency) are so difficult to quantify. What can
be done with a bit more confidence is to evaluate whether the trade-offs seem
in line with the trade-offs we accept as to other procedural protections.
Viewed this way, the transaction costs of mandatory explanation do not
seem excessive. The explanation could be delivered orally in open court at
the same time that the sentence is imposed; there would be no routine need for
additional proceedings. 172 Sentencing hearings already regularly include
statements by defendants, defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges. To
demand more consistently thorough remarks by judges is not likely to result in
a large increase in the amount of time sentencing hearings take. The sort of
explanation contemplated by my proposed principles need not be voluminous
or scholarly—the core of the sentencing analysis from McCleary that I have

170. See supra Part II.B.
171. As discussed above, the Wisconsin courts struggled with harmless error questions in
connection with the former statutory requirement that sentencing judges consider the guidelines. See
supra note 114.
172. There would, of course, be additional proceedings in cases in which sentences are vacated
for inadequate explanation. I believe there is sufficient clarity and deference in my explanation
review principles, however, that sentencing judges should be able to satisfy them without great
difficulty. Thus, reversal at the appellate level will not necessarily be a common occurrence even if
explanation standards are rigorously enforced. Moreover, it should be remembered that reversal on
explanation grounds only requires a resentencing; the defendant‘s conviction is n ot affected.
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proposed as a model occupies about three pages of the Wisconsin Reports.173
Certainly, the level of effort would be much less than federal judges must
routinely expend on Guidelines calculations alone.
An appropriate analogy might be to victim impact statements, which have
become an accepted part of the sentencing process in recent years,
notwithstanding the additional transaction costs they impose. 174 New
participation rights for victims at sentencing are intended to achieve similar
procedural justice goals to those that undergird the explanation requirement. 175
Another good analogy would be to the standard colloquy and recitation of
warnings in connection with guilty pleas, 176 or to the filing of Anders briefs by
court-appointed defense counsel in cases in which counsel does not see viable
grounds for an appeal.177 As with the explanation requirement, these
procedures involve modest incremental transaction costs that are justifiable on
the basis of enhancing perceptions of procedural justice and establishing
additional protections against substantively unjust outcomes.
We should also bear in mind the importance of the liberty interests at
stake in sentencing decisions. Our constitutional due process jurisprudence
properly recognizes that the need for reliable decision making is at its zenith
when the individual interests at stake are most important. 178 The logic of this
jurisprudence should make us particularly hesitant to reject explanation
review on the basis of mere transaction costs. If need be, though, distinctions
might be drawn based on the relative severity of the liberty deprivation. For
instance, explanation review might be limited to cases in which the defendant
was sentenced to more than a year of confinement.
2. Pro-Defendant Bias
I have framed my proposal as a set of principles that a defendant might

173. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 288–291, 182 N.W.2d 512, 524–26 (1971).
174. See, e.g., State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 64, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197
(discussing victim rights under Wisconsin law); Wayne A. Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in
Federal Capital Trials, 19 FED. SENT‘G REP. 5, 5 (2006) (―[Victim impact evidence] has become a
staple in federal death penalty trials . . . .‖).
175. See, e.g., Douglas E. Beloof, Judicial Leadership at Sentencing Under the Crime Victims’
Rights Act: Judge Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassell in Degenhardt, 19 FED. SENT ‘G REP. 36, 38
(2006) (discussing victims‘ rights to allocute at sentencing in terms of respect for the dignity of the
crime victim).
176. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (outlining federal procedure for accepting a guilty plea
and ensuring that it is knowing and voluntary).
177. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
178. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (―[T]he degree of potential
deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the
validity of any administrative decisionmaking process.‖); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972) (holding that loss of liberty when parole is revoked constitutes a ―grievous loss‖ that warrants
due process protections).
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invoke on appeal, but not the state. Structuring explanation review this way
reflects both a desire to limit transaction costs and the central concern I have
with defendant perceptions of respectful treatment. The state‘s interests in
respectful treatment seem much less threatened by the sentencing process, as
the state does not labor under the stigma and relative powerlessness of the
convicted defendant. Additionally, for reasons suggested in Part II, I suspect
that cognitive bias dynamics are more likely to push sentences in the direction
of greater severity than greater lenience; 179 this asymmetry, too, might justify
asymmetric explanation rights.
Still, I appreciate that the state may have concerns that judges will
systematically gravitate to more lenient sentences merely to minimize their
explanation obligations. Other forms of accountability (e.g., judicial
elections), as well as judges‘ internalized sense of obligation to vindicate
public and victim interests, may serve to allay concerns of a pro-defendant
bias. If not, recognizing parallel explanation rights for the state (e.g.,
requiring judges to explain themselves when they reject prosecution
arguments for a sentence above the guidelines range) might be accomplished
without a large increase in transaction costs. For instance, experience with
post-Booker sentencing appeals in the federal system shows that the
government has been far more selective than defendants in challenging
sentences.180
3. Too Much/Too Little Support for Guidelines
To someone accustomed to working in the federal system, my proposal
might be seen as providing too little weight for sentencing guidelines: I have
deliberately rejected the aspects of the current federal system that make
imposing the guidelines sentence the path of procedural least resistance. 181 Of
course, giving more weight to the guidelines might better serve uniformity
values. Additionally, the system might be perceived as more neutral to the
extent it more consistently followed guidelines based on objective factors, as
opposed to individual judges‘ determinations of which sentencing purposes to
emphasize and how to implement them.
To someone accustomed to working in the system of Wisconsin or a
similar state, the reverse criticism might be made: simply by requiring that
guidelines ranges be calculated in each case, my proposal will result in the
guidelines having greater influence than if they could be effectively ignored
(as permitted by Grady). If the guidelines themselves are poorly designed to
179. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34.
180. See U.S. SENT‘G COMM ‘N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.56 &
56A (2009), http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2009/SBTOC09.htm (showing 6,470 sentencing appeals
by defendants in fiscal year 2009, and only 64 by the government).
181. See supra note 142.
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achieve the purposes of sentencing, then greater adherence to the guidelines
may undermine the goal of purpose-advancing sentencing. Moreover, having
invested the effort to determine a guidelines range, the sentencing judge may
be less inclined to give full consideration to defendants‘ arguments for
lenience that are not based on guidelines factors.
By articulating the argument from each direction, we can see there is a
certain amount of tension among some of the values that my proposal is
intended to advance. With respect to procedural justice, for instance,
neutrality values favor a system that emphasizes a limited number of objective
factors, but such a system impedes purpose-advancing sentencing and
provides judges with less room to give meaningful consideration to the full
range of arguments that might be made for lenience. A focus on uniformity
values may lead to similar trade-offs.
In the end, all of the competing values seem important ones, and I have
accordingly attempted to give each some meaningful weight in the sentencing
process, locating a space roughly halfway between the Wisconsin and federal
systems. The best answer, though, may vary somewhat from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, based on, among other considerations, the quality and structure of
the available sentencing guidelines. A system like the federal system, with
guidelines that are exceptionally rigid and crude, 182 should be especially wary
of the consideration and purposefulness costs that arise from giving too much
weight to the guidelines. On the other hand, a system like Wisconsin‘s, with
much more flexible guidelines, 183 will lose much less by giving greater weight
to its guidelines. Ironically, Grady might have been a good decision in the
federal system, while Rita might have been a good decision in Wisconsin.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many sentencing judges, perhaps the great majority, consistently offer
thoughtful explanations for their sentences—explanations that help to reassure
each defendant that his judge was neutral and attentive to the arguments made
for lenience, and that the sentence imposed was intended to accomplish some
good purpose and to avoid unwarranted disparities. But, while this may be
the norm, there are also plenty of sentences like the ones in McCleary and
Rita, in which the judge‘s decision about sentence length seems reflexive and
thoughtless. Through rigorous explanation review, appellate courts can help
to ensure both the appearance and the reality of better reasoned, more
respectful sentences.
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court discovered after McCleary, however, it
is one thing for a high court to endorse explanation review and quite another
182. See O‘Hear, Myth, supra note 141, at 250–51.
183. See Hammer, supra note 88, at 16–17 (describing Wisconsin guidelines).
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for such review to be conducted in a manner that actually affects sentencing
practice. If courts are convinced of the value of explanation review, the
standards should be articulated more precisely and forcefully than was done in
McCleary and Gallion. Drawing on the most attractive features of
explanation review in the Wisconsin and federal systems, I have suggested a
preliminary set of eleven principles that would give more specific content to
the explanation requirement. Aspects of these principles are open to debate—
on the margins, I may demand too much of sentencing judges, or not quite
enough. But it is to be hoped that, regardless of how some of the specific
questions are resolved, the nation‘s appellate courts will more consistently
demand sentence explanations that befit decisions of such enormous gravity.

